On 1 October 2002, the State of Alaska increased taxes on malt beverages from $0.35 per gallon to $1.07 per gallon, increased taxes on wine from $0.85 per gallon to $2.50 per gallon, and increased taxes on distilled spirits from $5.60 per gallon to $12.80 per gallon. The net effect is that the tax on a standard serving rose from about 3 cents for beer, 2 cents for wine, and 4 cents for spirits to a uniform tax of 10 cents per standard serving of each type of alcohol beverage. This paper uses primary data on alcoholic beverage prices in Alaska to study a very basic question: What was the impact of the tax hikes on prices?
An alcohol tax hike is often viewed as a public health policy tool to discourage excessive alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems such as drunk driving. The impact of a tax hike on alcoholic beverage prices is a key link in the chain of the causality from the tax to public health. Economic theory and previous empirical studies, mainly of taxes on goods other than alcoholic beverages, do not provide very much guidance on what to expect following a tax hike. It is an empirical question. To answer the question, I conducted telephone surveys, just before and a year after the tax hike, of on-premise and off-premise alcohol retail establishments across Alaska.
I. Background
Most economists who have studied the issue agree that higher alcohol taxes or prices reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems (Philip J. Cook and Michael J. Moore [2002] review this research). The econometric studies typically estimate either the impact of taxes or the impact of prices on alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems: These studies do not directly estimate the relationship between taxes and prices. Instead, they yield estimates of the tax-or price-responsiveness, usually summarized by a tax or price elasticity. If a tax (T) is passed through to price (P) at a rate ␣ the relationship between the tax elasticity, TAX , and the price elasticity, PRICE , is given by PRICE ϭ TAX (␣T/P)
Ϫ1
. A standard assumption is that alcohol taxes are fully passed through to consumer prices at a rate ␣ ϭ 1: a 1-cent tax increase is assumed to result in a 1-cent price increase.
Economic theory raises questions about the assumption that alcohol taxes are fully passed through to consumer prices but does not provide firm answers. The extent to which taxes are passed through depends on demand and supply conditions and market competitiveness. Theory predicts that, in competitive industries with constant marginal costs of production, taxes will be fully passed through to consumers (␣ ϭ 1). In less competitive markets (which alcoholic beverage markets often are), theory predicts a number of possible outcomes. Nicholas Stern (1987) examines tax effects using a conjectural-variations model under a spectrum of possible market structures including perfect competition, monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly, and monopoly. After describing various possible outcomes about the rate of tax pass-through, Stern (p. 154) concludes that "Taken together these examples show that the simple analysis of tax shifting in perfect competition may be misleading and that one should allow for a much broader range of possibilities."
The empirical evidence on the extent to which taxes are passed through to prices is very limited. In an early study of liquor taxes and prices, Cook (1981) (2002) also estimate that the retail prices of three specific brands of alcoholic beverages rise by more than the amount of an excise tax; the implied passthrough rates ␣ range from about 1.6 to 2.1. There is also evidence of over-shifting of excise taxes in U.S. and European cigarette markets (e.g., Theodore E. Keeler et al., 1996; Sophia Delipalla and Owen O'Donnell, 2001 ). In contrast, James M. Poterba (1996) finds that retail clothing prices rise by approximately the amount of a sales tax. Timothy J. Besley and Harvey S. Rosen (1999) find similar results consistent with competitive markets (␣ ϭ 1) for Big Macs, eggs, Kleenex, and (ironically) Monopoly games. However, for more than half of the commodities they study, Besley and Rosen find evidence of over-shifting (␣ Ͼ 1).
II. Data on Alcoholic Beverage Prices in Alaska
The core data for this paper come from telephone surveys of Alaskan retail establishments licensed to serve alcohol. The survey utilized computer-assisted telephone interviewing techniques to collect pricing information from onpremise and off-premise alcohol retailers throughout the state of Alaska.
1 Two waves of surveys provide measures of alcoholic beverage prices before and after the 1 October 2002 tax hike. Data collection for the first wave took place over a 32-day period from 28 August through 28 September 2002. Data collection for the second wave took place about a year later, from 26 September to 20 October 2003. The second-wave surveys were conducted during the same time of the next year to avoid any seasonality effects on alcoholic beverage prices, and to allow sufficient time for the full impact of the tax hike on prices to be evident.
The survey sample was drawn from alcohol license records obtained from the State of Alaska's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. Of the 1,242 unduplicated license records, first-wave interviews were completed for 538. About 30 percent of attempted contacts resulted in refusals to participate in the survey; there were a number of reasons for the other non-interviews. Of the 538 establishments that completed firstwave surveys, 403 were successfully recontacted and completed second-wave surveys. Of the 403 establishments that completed both survey waves, about 81 percent were characterized by interviewees as on-premise outlets and 19 percent as off-premise establishments. This compares to 72 percent on-premise and 28 percent off-premise in the total population of outlets in Alaska.
On-premise prices were collected for individual servings of a 12-ounce can or bottle for beer, a typical glass for wine, and a standard shot for spirits, where the serving size of wine and spirits is reported by the respondent. Off-premise calculations were based on six-packs of beer, 750-ml bottles of wine and 750-ml bottles of spirits. The prices of the eight best-selling brands of beer and six best-selling brands of spirits in the United States were collected. Because wine sales are typically split among a wide variety of brands and varieties, the survey requested only the price of each establishment's most frequently sold brand.
III. Results
For the calculations of brand-specific rates of tax pass-through, the unit of observation is an establishment. The rate of tax pass-through for each brand of each product is calculated for the sample of establishments that provided a price for the beverage in question in both survey waves. As a result, the sample size varies across brands; for example, 267 on-premise establishments provided prices of Budweiser in both waves, but only 144 establishments provided prices for Corona. The results for brands with very small sample sizes are not reported here. In most cases where prices of a given brand are missing, it is because establishments simply did not carry the brand in either wave.
The real price hike between the waves is calculated as the difference between the secondwave price and the inflation-adjusted first-wave price. Based on the all-items Consumer Price Index for the Western region, inflation was es-1 Through subcontracts from Cornell University and the NBER to the Prevention Research Center, Paul Gruenewald and Andrew Treno oversaw the design and administration of the surveys. The surveys were conducted by the survey firm, Population Research Systems. Treno et al. (2004) discuss the survey methods in more detail and conduct additional analysis of the data from the first wave.
timated to be about 3 percent between the waves.
2 The tax pass-through rate is calculated by dividing the real price change by the amount of the tax hike for the beverage and quantity in question. Table 1 presents the mean baseline price from the first wave, the mean price hike, and the mean tax pass-through rate. (Although there were a few establishments that reported either large price increases or decreases between the waves, the median pass-through rates are similar to the means reported in Table 1 .) For virtually all cases, the mean rates of tax passthrough are substantially over 1, suggesting that alcohol taxes are more than fully passed through to prices. For both on-premise and off-premise establishments, for many brands of beer the mean pass-through rates are around 2. For offpremise establishments the mean pass-through rates are also around 2 for many brands of spirits. But for on-premise wine and on-premise spirits the pass-through rates are even higher and generally range from 3 to 4.
To further explore the pass-through process, consider a brand-specific simple regression of the form:
Real price hike ϭ ␤ 0 ϩ ␤ 1 ͑baseline price͒.
As is typical in the United States, the Alaskan alcohol tax is not an ad valorem tax, but is an excise tax based on the quantity of the beverage purchased. Therefore, in a simple model of tax pass-through the real price hike in response to a tax hike should be unrelated to the baseline price. This implies that ␤ 1 should be zero. The constant term ␤ 0 divided by the tax hike amount would then provide an estimate of the rate of tax pass-through.
To illustrate the results, the estimated regression line for the prices of Budweiser sold onpremise (N ϭ 267) is:
Real price hike ϭ 0.7296 Ϫ 0.1887 ͑baseline price͒ ͑t ϭ 5.7͒ ͑t ϭ 4.53͒ .
The results of most of the other brand-specific regressions are similar (results available from the author upon request). Contrary to the simple model of pass-through, the estimates of ␤ 1 are always negative and usually statistically significant.
2 The all-items CPI for Anchorage implies a very similar inflation rate. The trends in the CPI for "food away from home" might also shed light on what would have happened to alcoholic beverage prices in the absence of the tax hike. In the Western region of the United States, inflation in the price of food away from home was about 2.1 percent; in Anchorage, it was about 3.8 percent. Another way to judge what would have happened to alcoholic beverage prices in the absence of the tax hike is to look at the Producer Price Index, which does not include excise taxes. From the PPI, over this time period wholesale price inflation in the brewery industry was about 3.3 percent, while wholesale prices in the winery and distillery industries did not increase. This implies that the establishments that at baseline charged higher prices for a given brand passed through less of the tax hike to their customers. In fact, if the regression equations are evaluated at the maximum observed baseline price (which was over $4.00 for on-premise Budweiser), the predicted price hikes are about zero for most brands of most products. Conversely, the predicted price hikes for the establishments that charged the lowest observed prices imply rates of tax pass-through even higher than the mean rates reported in Table 1 .
IV. Discussion
This study of the Alaskan tax hike provides evidence that alcohol taxes are more than fully passed through to beverage prices. The general pattern of results is consistent with the limited evidence from earlier studies. In addition, this study provides the first evidence that taxes are over-shifted in both on-premise and off-premise establishments, and that the pass-through patterns are similar across most popular brands of beer, wine, and spirits. Most previous econometric studies fail to estimate all of the links in the chain of causality running from the policy tool of taxes to prices to alcohol consumption patterns to public-health outcomes. By providing evidence about one of the structural relationships in the chain of causality, these new results complement the reduced-form approach used in most previous studies. Because consumption at on-premise establishments may be more likely to result in adverse outcomes including drunk driving, the new evidence on tax pass-through at on-premise establishments is particularly important.
A caveat is that the estimates of pass-through depend upon assumptions about what would have happened to alcoholic beverage prices in Alaska between fall 2002 and fall 2003 in the absence of the tax hikes. Available evidence suggests that over this time period inflation was low (around 3 percent) in Anchorage and the Western region of the United States. But if inflation was higher in some parts of Alaska, or if there were cost shocks other than the tax hike over this period, the estimates in Table 1 may overstate the rate of tax pass-through.
Regardless of uncertainty about the average rate of tax pass-through, it is striking that, after taxes increased, different establishments in Alaska raised their prices by much different amounts. Simple regressions reveal one systematic pattern: within a brand, higher baseline prices are associated with lower price increases following the tax hike. Future work can explore more aspects of the tax pass-through process. For example, is there within-establishment heterogeneity in tax pass-through? Or was it more common for an establishment to raise prices uniformly across the price spectra?
Alaska is also a useful laboratory in which to study local retail markets for alcoholic beverages. Local markets range in size from Anchorage, which has hundreds of outlets and a relatively high outlet density, to many small and remote localities where it is typical for a small number of retailers to have substantial local market power. Future work can test predictions from industrial organization and public economics, that the degree of local market competition determines the rate at which a tax hike is passed through to prices.
